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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The public has every right to expect NYPD to justly safeguard life, liberty and property,
and NYPD has every right to engage in lawful stop and frisk activity to meet this expectation.
To continue to fulfill its mission, though, NYPD cannot be made to follow legions of leaders
installed by the predilections of outside political and judicial forces, and without justification.
This is exactly what plaintiffs attempted to do for ten weeks of trial and the preceding years of
litigation, as they failed to prove their speculation that NYPD must be violating the Constitution
because most people who are stopped and frisked are Black and Hispanic males, For years,
plaintiffs have employed unsuccessfully a scattershot approach to meet their burden of proof,
Plaintiffs disregarded that NYPD deploys most heavily in the areas with the highest crime rates
based on crime reports -- generally majority minority neighborhoods where the victims are
majority minority -- and that the racial breakdown of NYPD stops and frisks strongly correlates
with the racial breakdown of reported crime suspects.
Plaintiffs failed to prove that any City policy or practice has caused any widespread
pattern of unconstitutional stop and frisk activity or has been undertaken with any racially
discriminatory intent. Instead, plaintiffs mounted a general attack on NYPD's 4.3 million stops
since 2004, ignoring the totality of the circumstances integral to any Fourth Amendment analysis
and groping to find patterns in stops based on paperwork noting furtive movements or suspicious
bulges. Plaintiffs simply had no unified proof of a pattern of unconstitutional stops, and even
their expert's opinion shows that most stop activity is supported by reasonable suspicion. Nor
did plaintiffs prove a unified theory of causation or deliberate indifference; instead, they latched
on to what they argued was an ineffective system of audits, which in actuality did uncover
weaknesses in stop documentation that NYPD has sought to remedy continuously, or plaintiffs
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seized upon the tabloid exposés of a very few disgruntled police officers who complained that
NYPD had quotas that caused unconstitutional stops, although none that they themselves made
of plaintiffs. Plaintifß did not and could not prove their case on the facts presented, and have
instead asked this Court to make giant unreasonable inferences that amount to nothing more than
mere speculation. Plaintiffs have not proven any basis whatsoever on which this Court can find
liability or issue injunctive relief.
I. No Named Plaintiff Suffered a 4th Amendment ("4th Am.") Violation.l
The City cannot be subjected to 4th Am. Monell liability unless at least one plaintiff
proves by a preponderance of the evidence a stop andlor frisk without reasonable suspicion. A
prerequisite to a Monell claim is an underlying constitutional violation, e.g., Segal v, City of New
York,459 F.3d207,219 (2d Cir.2006), and this requirement is as stringent in class actions.
Lewis v. Casey,5l8 U.S. 343,357 (1996). Here, none of the four named plaintiffs has proven an
underlying constitutional violation:
Three stops (April2007 (Floyd), and February and June 2008 (Ourlicht), Findings of Fact("FOF") 3, 18-19, 20), had such vague and inconsistent descriptions that no officers
could be identified. Plaintiffs have not proven that these stops occurred as plaintifß
testified, particularly given NYPD's sufficient efforts to identify any participating
officers, Id. Even if the Court finds these John Doe stops did occur, they are not
representative of stops where officers are identified and cannot support a widespread
pattern of similar stops. 2
I Plaintiffs withdrew all damages claims, and claims against defendants Bloomberg and Kelly
were dismissed, Floyd,813 F. Supp, 2d at 456. There is no basis for plaintiffs to pursue their
Third through Tenth Claims, which includes their state law claims, See Second Amended
Complaint 37-44. Plaintifß failure to present evidence of the NYPD's receipt of federal funds is
fatal to their Title VI claim. See 42 U.S.C. g 2000d.
2 Floyd's April stop and Ourlicht's February stop began as an approach and question, FOF 3, 19,
and officers do not need reasonable suspicion to ask a person for identifying information.
Muehler v. Mena,544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005). In Ourlicht's June stop, the emergency report of a
loose gun between four to five men in a small private location, FOF 18, gave the officers
reasonable suspicion to stop the men proximate to that limited area, (J.5. v. Bold,l g F.3d 99, 104
(2d Cir. 1994), and frisk them. U.S. v. Jaramillo,25 F.3d 1146, ll52 (2d Cir. 1994).
a
.,
-L-
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One stop (January 2006 (Clarkson), FOF 16) was merely an approach and question not
requiring reasonable suspicion, Florida v. Bostick,50l U.S, 429,434 (1991), and not
requiring officers to infórm the individual that he is free not to respond.3 Zieper v.
Metzinger,392 F. Supp. 2d 516,530 (S.D.N.Y, 2005). Further, blocking the path of an
individual, U.S. v. Drayton,536 U.S. I94,205 (2002); accord Pinto-Montoyav. Mukasey,
540 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir.2008), or asking incriminating questions, Bostick,501 U.S. at
439, does not render a person "stopped" within the meaning of the 4th Am.
One stop (January 12,2008 (Dennis), FOF 14) was based on probable cause to issue a
summons for an open container of alcohol,
Two stops (January 30, 2008 (Ourlicht) and February 27,2008 (Floyd), FOF 4, 17) were
supported by reasonable suspicion, Ourlicht's because the officer observed a suspicious
bulge and Ourlicht engaged in furtive movements, FOF 77,and Floyd's because of his
fiddling with the door for at least one minute and looking up and down the street, his
pos.sion of a bag and a large ring of keys, and the known burglary pattern,4 FOF 4.
Terry v. Ohio,392 U,S. 1 (1968). These frisks were justified given the violent nature of
the crimes suspected (burglary and criminal possession of a weapon), Floyd's
inconsistent answers to officers' questions, and Ourlicht's bulge. /d.
Plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence from eight class member witnesses regarding 12 stops also
fails. Three of Peart's stops were John Doe stops (see discussion, supra).s FOF 7. All of the
other stops also fail to prove a constitutional violation:
o Four stops (February 5, 2008 and February 24, 2üf (Lino), February 12, 2010
(Sindayiganza), and August 5,2006' (Peart), FOF 2, 6, 8, 9) were based at least in part on
3 This was also a John Doe stop (see discus sion, supra).
a Reasonable suspicion existed even without knowledge of a known burglary pattern.
s Peart's April 13,2011 stop appears to be supported by reasonable suspicion as Peart testified
that the unidentified officers who stopped him informed him that he matched the description of
someone who had been ringing a doorbell attempting to gain entry to a building. FOF 7,
6 Lino's jacket at his February 24,2011 stop, was of the same distinct brand, color, material and
baggy fit as in the wanted poster. FOF 9. This close resemblance supports reasonable suspicion,
especially given Lino's close proximity to the crime location. Cf. Hargroves v. City of New
York, 4l I Fed. Appx. 378 (Feb. 22,2011) (objectively reasonable to perceive red and navy blue
jacket as orange and black given the time of night, and close proximity to the crime scene.)
7 Although plaintiffs argued in closing that the 911 call was anonymous, they did not present any
evidence of this attrial, Even assuming an anonymous call, the offrcers also observed additional
suspicious behavior, including bulges, and Peart refused to comply with the offrcers' orders, FOF
6, leading to reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., U.S. v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2009)
(man matching description from anonymous call refused to remove hands from pockets); tlS, v.
â
-J-
a
a
a
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a suspect description known to the ofhcers through a citizen complainant, surveillance
video, or wanted poster, and thus were all supported by reasonable suspicion. People v.
Johnson,22 A.D.3d 371 (l't Dep't 2005); see also, Johnson v. Artus,2009 U.S, Dist.
LEXIS 26534 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2009) (report and recommendation) adopted,2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44839 (S.D.N.Y. May 28,2009).
Cornelio MacDonald's December 19, 2009 stop, FOF 13, was based on the offtcers'
observation of him with a suspicious bulge in his pocket, walking as if carrying a weapon
in an area with two active crime patterns for burglary and robbery. U.S. v. Heruing,373
Fed. Appx. 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (high crime area, engaged in furtive movements, with a
suspicious bulge in jacket),
Almonor's March 10, 2010 stop was based on his proximity to a radio run for disorderly
youths, looking over his shoulder, grabbing his waistband when stepping off the curb and
jaywalking), FOF 12.8 Likewise, officers had reason to approach Downs for smoking
marijuana on August 20,2008 based on how he held his hand up to his mouth. Coupled
with his behavior when the officers asked him about their suspicion of drug use and with
the major crime problems in the blocks near his house, FOF 11, offtcers had reasonable
suspicion for the stop. Terry.e
Acevedo's l|lf.ay 29,2007 stop, FOF 15, was an approach and question, Bostick,50l U,S,
at 434, and that the officers followed her in a van after she ran away does not rise to the
level of a stop requiring reasonable suspicion. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S, 567,
574-75 (1988); Cru v. Miller,255 F.3d 77,84 (2dCir.2001).
Provost's November 24,2009 stop, FOF 5 was based on probable cause for possession of
a knife in plain view. Moreover, the observation of several inches of what an officer
knew, based on his training and experience to be a knife, at a minimum provided
reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop, See People v. Fernandez, 16 N.Y.3d 596 (2011)
(officer observed the head of knife clipped to and sticking out of the defendant's pocket);
People v. Arps,293 A,D.zd260 (1't Dep't 2002) (officer observed a bulge and saw what
appeared to be the handle of a gun sticking out of the defendant's pocket).
Manuel,64 Fed. Appx. 823,826-827 (2d Cir, 2003) (anonymous 911 call, bulge in waist area,
and proximity to crime scene).
8 Terryv. Ohio,392 U.S. 1 (1963); see also Peoplev. Hewitt,247 A,D.2d552(2dDep't l99S)
(officers responding to radio transmission observed individual who did not match the
description, but was committing a minor violation (open container), and making furtive
movements towards a bulge in his waistband); People v. Jenkins,209 A.D.2d 164 (l't Dep't
1994) (when ofhcers made eye contact with defendant he turned away, began to behave
nervously, reached into his waistband and removed an object and tossed it away), As probable
cause existed for jaywalking, Almonor's detention was justified even though he was not
ultimately charged or summonsed for jaywalking. See Devenpeck v. Alford,543 U.S. 146 (2004).
e The CCRB substantiated Downs' complaint against two officers who did not recall the stop;
NYPD disciplined them for failing to make memobook entries for the day. FOF 1L
a
o
o
a
-4-
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II. There Is No Evidence to Support a Widespread Pattern of Constitutional Violations
Caused by a Municipal Policy/Deliberate Indifference
In order to support Monell liability, an actionable municipal practice/pattem must itself
cause constitutional violations on a widespread basis. Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65,
S0 (2d Cir. 2006). Put another way, "Monell s policy or custom requirement is satisfied where a
local government is faced with a pattem of misconduct and does nothing, compelling the
conclusion that the local government has acquiesced in or tacitly authorized its subordinates'
unlawful actions." Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, I92 (2d Cir.2007). The constitutional
violations must be sufficiently widespread and of a similar type by improperly trained,
supervised, monitored or disciplined employees. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350,
1360 (2011). The alleged pattern must be sufficiently specific to the violation claimed by a
named plaintiff; broadly setting forth evidence of a pattern, widespread or otherwise, of 4th Am.
violations (or even a subset of 4th Am. violations, such as Terry stops and/or frisks) is
insufficient. See Id. (rejecting pattern related broadly to Brady violations and not sufficiently
specilrc to the type of claimed Brady). Only if the pattern is suffrciently widespread have courts
held that the municipality is on constructive notice of the alleged constitutional deprivations.
8.g., City of St, Louis v. Paprotnik,485 U.S. 112, 127 & 130 (1988); Chinv. New YorkCity
Hous. Auth.,575 F. Supp. 2d 554,564 (S.D,N.Y. 2008).
However, even if a sufficiently widespread pattern of similar violations exists to put the
municipality on notice, plaintiffs must prove that the City was deliberately indffirent to the need
to train, supervise, monitor or discipline its police offrcers and that the lack of such training,
supervision, monitoring or discipline actually caused the plaintiffs alleged violation. See
Connick, 131 S. Ct, at 1358. Deliberate indifference requires a deliberate choice to retain a
program of training, supervision, monitoring or discipline despite actual or constructive notice
-5-
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that a particular omission in such program causes constitutional violations. Id.; see also Bd of
Cnty Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 4I2 (1997) (culpability "must depend on a finding fhal
th[e] officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff ').r0
A. ll
Anecdotally, the named plaintiffs' stops were diverse and had no common threads. FOF
3-4,14,16-19. Three had identified offrcers, whereas four were John Doe stops; one was based
in part on an ongoing burglary pattern; one was based on a 9l I call; one was an approach and
question, whereas another was based on probable cause; three were based on a suspected violent
crime such as criminal possession of a weapon, and four were either non-violent offenses or the
suspected crime could not be determined. Id, Combining the named plaintiffs' stops, id., with
the stops of the class member witnesses, FOF 2,5-13, 15, only further dilutes any indicia of
pattern: overall, four stops involved radio runs, one involved a direct citizen complaint, and the
others involved a variety of observations by the officers; one involved a wanted poster; one
involved a surveillance video; and five incidents had multiple persons stopped, whereas the other
l4 involved a single person. The myriad circumstances of the l9 stops illustrate the wide variety
l0 Existence of a widespread pattern of constitutional violations is not a conclusive presumption
of municipal liability or deliberate indifference, or proof of an unofficial custom through
acquiescence, particularly where a municipality has attempted to address the causes of the
pattern. See Reynolds, 506 F.3d aI192 &.I97; Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartfurd,36l F.3d
ll3,126 (2dCir.2004);Terminate Control Corp. v. Nu-Life Constr. Corp.,28F.3d1335,1349-
50 (2d Cir. 1994). ln Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir.
1992) deliberate indifference was not addressed because the discriminatory practices were so
entrenched as to imply municipal acquiescence and there was no evidence that City sought to
address misconduct at issue).
rrBoth anecdotal and statistical evidence is necessary to prove a pattern and practice. Sorlucco,
971 F.2d at 872; see also EEOC v, Bloomberg,778 F. Supp. 2d 458,469 (2011) (systemic
practice of discrimination ordinarily established by using strong statistical and anecdotal
evidence). Further, each plaintiff must show a pattern of constitutional violations similar to the
one he or she experienced. Connick,l3l S. Ct. at 1360. Alone, plaintifß' statistical evidence is
insufficient to establish the "gross statistical disparities" necessary to establish a widespread
pattern. Hazelwood School Dist. v. U.5.,433 U.S.299,307-08 (1977).
-6-
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of situations faced by the officers on the street at the times of the stops. This miniscule self-
selection of stops is simply insufficient a basis from which any reasonable inferences can be
made about the 4,43 million stops or any subset thereof -- it is too small to be probative of a
widespread pattern within the City when compared to the size of the allegedly affected group.
See Jones v. Town of East Haven,691 F.3d 72, 82-83 (2d Cir.2012) (six incidents insufficient to
show the necessary widespread pattem of abuse by police); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588
F.3d 838, 851-52 (5th Cir. 2009) (size of police department relevant to "widespread pattern"
inquiry); cf., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,l3l S, Ct.2541,2556 (2011).
But, it is not just the paucity of 19 stops from the millions of stops at issue that renders
the anecdotal evidence insufficient to support a finding of pattern, it is the very nature of the
totality of the circumstances inquiry that must be made to determine if a constitutional violation
exists.l2 Plaintiffs' case is not saved by combining the anecdotes with Fagan's various statistical
analyses and no reasonable inferences can be drawn to shore up the deficiencies in this proof.
FOF 69-89. First of all, the UF250 database simply cannot support the conclusions Fagan tries
to draw from it. A UF250 alone provides no basis to conclude here that a stop was
impermissible; the form was not designed to support such a finding in a court of law, and no
factfinder would ever rest on a form to conclude that a stop was unlawful. And if a single form
does not establish that a stop was unlawful, thousands of forms do not establish that thousands of
stops were unlawful. Moreover, it cannot be held against any officer-much less tens if not
hundreds of thousands of offrcers in the aggregate-that the form uses conclusory terms to
describe a host of possible bases for a stop. Fagan cannot have it both ways----either he accepts
12 The nature of this inquiry is also the very reason why this case has been improperly certihed as
a class action. Perhaps if the stops at issue were all for a crime suspected that had been declared
unconstitutional, there could be some weight to the stops as supportive of a pattern, but that is
not the case alleged, let alone proven.
-7 -
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the credibility of the form, and that "furtive movement" means "furtive movement" giving rise to
reasonable suspicion or he does not. See Ligon v, City of New York,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22383 at 135 (S,D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013) ("It is possible to imagine scenarios in which an officer
observing behavior that would probably give rise to reasonable suspicion might reasonably
record that behavior by checking nothing more than 'Furtive Movements,"'), or he cannot rely
on the database at all and must supplement his analysis with information from sources other than
the form. Even accepting Fagan's reliance on a database full of checkboxes, Fagan's conclusion
that only 6Yo of the 4.43 million stops are apparently unjustified on its face is hardly a
widespread pattern. Moreover, Fagan does not link these 60/o to the 19 anecdotal stops and
cannot, particularly with the John Doe stops or the fact that none of the UF250 stops fall into
Fagan's self-made classifications, As for combining the 6Yo with the approximately l2%o of
stops that Fagan declares ungeneralizable, this 18% portion of the 4.43 million stops once again
is not necessarily a widespread pattern, as Fagan does nothing to link these stops in patterns of
similar constitutional violations.'3 FOF 85; see also Connick, l3l S. Ct. at 1360. In fact, Fagan
acknowledged that under his analysis the apparently unjustified stops are
13 To the extent that the ungeneralizable UF250s fall in to the small sub-category of the 62,437
for 2004-2009 having "furtive movement" checked, with nothing else checked on the back,
neither Fagan nor plaintiffs offer any link between those UF250s to the 19 anecdotal stops.
Firstly, they cannot link these stops to the John Doe stops, which do not have UF250s by
deflrnition; secondly, they cannot do so with the UF250 stops that have different permutations of
checkboxes and information; and thirdly, they cannot do so with the UF250 stops at all because,
as the testimony exemplified, the totality of the circumstances of a stop indicative of reasonable
suspicion can go well beyond the markings on a UF250, Floyd v. City of New York,867 F. Supp.
2d274,291 &,293 (S.D.N.Y.2012);see also Floridav, Haruis, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056 (2013)
(rejecting reliance on error rates in the context of dog sniffs for drugs-affirming that the totality
of circumstances analysis under the 4th Am. cannot or should not be reduced to a mathematical
formula); Ricketts v. City of Columbiø,36 F3d 775,781-82 (8th Cir. 1994) ("not all of the
differences that enter into the discretionary decision ofwhether to arrest can be properly assessed
and quantified through statistics"); Watson v. City of Kansas City,857 F.2d 690,695 (1Oth Cir,
1988) ("Whether or not probable cause exists is not susceptible to statistical quantification").
What cannot be done based on a single form cannot be done in the aggregate, either.
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not evenly distributed across New York City at the borough, precinct, neighborhood or even
census tract level. FOF 85.
Nor does the notion of the 1 in l0 "hitrate" 
- 
or "dry stops," as the Court has termed
stops that do not result in an arrest or summons, or the recovery of a weapon - establish a
widespread pattern of suspicionless stops or notice thereof. FOF 88-91.14 The wide gulf of legal
justification between reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause to arrest or summons in
and of itself makes the hit rate irrelevant.ls This is the same reasoning that the Court used when
it precluded defendant from adducing evidence of effectiveness of stop and frisk practices in
reducing crime because of its inelevancy to the 4'h Am, analysis,l6
Serving both as notice of no widespread pattern of constitutional violations, and as a lack
of deliberate indifference are the indisputable facts that: on its own NYPD enabled Rand to study
its stop practices; Rand concluded that there was no systemic constitutional problem and did so
relying on suspect description as the best of the three known benchmarks in the field (which
ra Since 1999, Fagan has admitted that a 1 in t hit rate for arrests is not problematic. Since
summonses, like arrests, require probable cause, the undisputed and consistent NYPD 12% hit
rate for arrests and summonses combined likewise cannot be problematic.
15 Plaintiffs rely heavily on City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), for the
proposition that the NYPD's "hit rate" is no better (or even worse) than random results. Apart
from being factually dissimilar cases, the stops in Edmond were far from random. See 531 U.S.
at 35-36 (noting the use of crime conditions and narcotics dogs to search vehicles, which would
serve to increase the amount of contraband recovered and the corresponding hit rate because
vehicles can store more contraband than a person). More analogous to random hit rates are the
0.12-L5%hit rates noted in Michigan Dep't of state Police v. sitz,496 u.s. 444,454-55 (1990).
'6 To the extent, however, that the Court seeks to impute some knowledge about the legality of
the stops based on the hit rate, this is a novel analysis, heretofore unknown in the case law, and,
at a minimum, the City cannot be held to be on notice of a phenomenon that had not been
previously identified as constitutionally suspect. See Young v. County of Fulton,160 F.3d 899,
904 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[t]o be deliberately indifferent to rights requires that those rights be clearly
established"). Young involved a failure to train claim, which could not be maintained since the
right at issue was not "clearly established" at the time of the violation. Id. at 903-4, The
reasoning of Young, however, would apply equally to a "custom or practice" claim since the
required state of mind 
- 
"deliberate indiffeÍence" 
- 
is the same.
-9
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NYPD continues to rely on today); despite a lack of a problem, NYPD implemented five of the
six Rand recommendations, and gave thoughtful reasons for not implementing or continuing all
of them. FOF 20-21. Plaintiffs' criticisms of the City's implementation of the Rand
recommendations are without merit, and plaintiffs' expert Reiter's central premise that the
NYPD refused to address the RAND recommendations is absurd. FOF 22. Moreover, "second-
guessing" NYPD is not a basis for Monell liability. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391-
92 (1989); Reynolds,506 F.3d at 198. Clearly the NYPD's efforts to address the concerns raised
at the time of the RAND report were not "patently inadequate", "severe" or "quite deficient".
Reynolds,506 F.3d at 192-93.
B. LackofCausation/I)eliberatelndifference
Ouotas. Plaintiffs specifically allege 
- 
and fail to prove 
- 
pressure that NYPD puts on its
officers to meet quotas for arrests, summonses and UF250s causes a widespread pattern of
unconstitutional stops. First, there is no evidence whatsoever linking any of the 19 anecdotal
stops to an officer who made the stop, with or without reasonable suspicion, to meet a quota and
avoid negative employment action, FOF 55-66, There is not even evidence that an officer made
such a stop to fulfill a quota or a productivity goal regardless of any fear of negative employment
actions. Id. Among the officers who were involved in the named plaintiffs' individual incidents,
no two partners had the same activity, and no ofhcer was punished, rewarded or "pressured"
based on activity levels. FOF 59. Even with respect to those offrcers who asserted that they
were required to meet specific enforcement levels earlier in their careers, plaintifß were unable
to establish that these officers (or any officers) were punished as a result of their failure to reach
such levels. FOF 59,63-66. This is a sideshow, There is overwhelming evidence that no quotas
exist and that officers do not believe that they will be punished if they do not meet a numerical
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threshold. FOF 59-61. A performance goal 
- 
an acceptable personnel tool, see FOF 56-57 
- 
is
not a quota. Operations Order 52 legitimately expressly encourages perfoffnance goals in
relation to addressing identifìed crime conditions. See FOF 57 (performance goals as informal
guidance and relating to summons and arrest activity).
Further proof of the lack of quotas is the aggregate numerical data. There are
approximately 19,000 uniformed officers working in patrol functions in the NYPD. See FOF 62.
In2011, NYPD officers conducted approximately 685,000 stops. Id. Using simple math, that
means that ofhcers average three stops per month, which average is less when using simple math
for the other years between 2004-2012. Moreover, officers typically work 20-25 tours on patrol
per month, each with an 8 hour and 35 minute shift; therefore, officers average one stop every
sixth to seventh day on patrol. Id. These calculations cannot be a basis to infer that officers are
pressured to make unconstitutional stops. FOF 62 ('impossible not to see violation when work
25 days on patrol').
Finally, the tape recordings of the self-selected snippets of roll calls from three
commands in which numbers are spoken of by supervisors is not a basis to believe that they were
threatening negative employment action if the numbers were not met - and it would be rank
speculation to determine that such negative action had actually occurred.lT The recordings
provide no basis whatsoever from which any reasonable inference can be drawn that quotas or
pressure for activity existed that drove offrcers to make unconstitutional stops. FOF 60, 66.
Moreover, since N.Y. Labor Law $ 2I5-a was changed in 2010 to prohibit additional "quota"
enforcement activity, the NYPD explicitly prohibited quotas in Operation Order 52 and
explained the appropriate use of performance goals. FOF 55. None of the purported roll call
l7 None of the plaintiffs' alleged encounters occurred within these three precincts
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recordings (from only three of 76 precincts) were made since that time. Id.
Deliberate Indifference/Specific Deficiencies. Plaintiffs also have failed to prove any
specific deficiencies in the City's training, supervision, monitoring or discipline and that such
deficiencies actually caused their alleged constitutional deprivations - were the moving force
behind a widespread pattern of constitutional violations. .8 g., Harris, 489 U,S. at 391 Jenkins v.
City of New York,478 F.3d 76,94 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Amnesty, supra,361 F.3d at 130
(plaintffi ' burden to rule out causes of the alleged 4th Am. violations that would not support
City liability, such as negligent program administration or offtcers' negligent or intentional
disregard of training). Causation cannot be inferred from evidence of a need for training,
supervision, monitoring or discipline by itself or proof of deliberate indifference, Connick, I37
S. Ct. at 1358 n.5.
Plaintiffs have always seemed hard-pressed to identify any specific flaws in any of the
City's policies. Connick,l3l S. Ct. at 1365 (deliberate indifference requires speciJìed flaw and
"highly predictable" incorrect officer decisions). In fact, along with the red hening of their
empty quota theory and misperceived flaws in auditing and command self-inspection policies
addressed infra, plaintiffs launch a scattershot attack at all levels of NYPD's managerial
operations, hoping to hit upon a theory or deficiency that glues together their Monell theory of
liability. But they simply do not have the evidence to pull it all together, and they are resigned to
arguing 
- 
notwithstanding a lack of proof, FOF 36-48 
- 
that there is (or must be) some sort of
problem with the City's officer-oversight practices that has resulted in the number of stops of
minorities, andlor that the City simply needs more or better training, supervision, monitoring
andlor discipline,
Hqrris recognized that deliberate indifference exists where "the need for more or
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different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy ro likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights." 489 U.S. at 390. Broad, unspecihc suggestions of more or better training
do not satisfy a plaintiff s Monell burden. Connick, 1 3 1 S. Ct. at 1363-64 ("showing merely that
additional training would have been helpful in making difficult decisions does not establish
municipal liability"); Young v. City of Providence, 404F,3d 4,27 (lst Cir. 2005) ("the fact that
training is imperfect or not in the precise form a plaintiff would prefer is insufficient to make
such a showing"). Rather, plaintiffs must prove that the City was deliberately indifferent with
respect to an identified "specific deficiency" in the City's training, monitoring, supervision or
discipline program. Amnesty,36l F.3d at 129. "Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of
fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action." Connick, 131 S, Ct. at 1360.
As the Reynolds court emphasized, the measure of the adequacy of a municipality's
conduct and its systems is not "ultimate success." See 506 F.3d at 196 ("the extent of state
defendants' ultimate success in averting injury cannot be the legal measure of its efforts to do so,
as such a standard is tantamount to vicarious liability"). Plaintiffs' burden to show a deficiency
is particularly heavy where the issue is the City's response to a potential policing problem. See
id. at 192-93. Vy'here, as here, the City's "policy incorporates [its] deliberate efforts to protect
plaintiffs' rights, it cannot, at the same time, be deemed deliberately indifferent to those rights."
Id. at 197 ("la] natural presumption arises in such cases that any supervisory inadequacies are
the result of negligence rather than deliberate choice"); see Haruis, 489 U,S. at 391-92 (the
importance of fault and causation to avoid de facto respondeat superior liability and "second-
guessing [of] municipal employee-training programs lthat] federal courts are ill-suited to
undertake fand which] would implicate serious questions of federalism").
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Training. Plaintiffs have not proven any deficiency in training that can be responsible
for impermissible suspicionless stops in which individuals do not feel free to leave, Recruits and
impact officers receive extensive training on reasonable suspicion, including when a person
objectively may not feel free to leave, trespass crimes, Penal laws and Constitutional Law (both
NYS and Federal); Characteristics of Armed Suspects; NYPD Policy Prohibiting Racial
Profiling; Impartial Policing; Discretion; Policing a Multicultural City; Tactics; and Memobook
entries/Activity logs. FOF 43-44. Training continues throughout offltcers' careers with roll call
training, legal bulletins, informal on the job training, formal annual in service training,
promotional training, and even special reinforcement training programs, like the recent
Rodman's Neck training. FOF 45-46. V/hile it may be debatable after the fact to determine if
any one encounter may rise to the level of a 4th Am, detention 
- 
that's what juries are for -- the
training explains the various factors that may lead a person to objectively believe that they have
been detained.rs Given the quality of the substance of NYPD's training, any finding of liability
or remedy based on it would be an inappropriate intrusion into local governance. Connick, l3I
S. Ct. at 1363 ("The statute does not provide plaintiffs or courts carte blanche to micromanage
local governments throughout the United States.").
Supervision.te The NYPD relies on a chain of command of supervisors, namely,
l8 The taped exchange between McCormack and Serrano illustrates a supervisor's attempt to
train an officer on when a person is stopped and exemplifies how changes in tone and inflection
may morph an encounter into a reasonable suspicion stop. FOF 65. Further, on the recording,
McCormack reiterated that officers can only stop individuals based on reasonable suspicion,
while also noting that officers must pay attention to suspect descriptions and known crime
conditions during their given tour. FOF 65.
le NYPD's multi-layered supervisory hierarchy and accountability, coupled with the lack of
evidence of a widespread practice, makes any liability finding for failure to supervise speculative
at best. Cf,, Jones v. Town of East Haven,691 F.3d 72,82 (2d Cir.2012) (Monell liability may
exist where there is a widespread pattern of constitutional abuses sufficient to support the
conclusion that such abuses were a custom among police offlrcers, and that supervisory personnel
-14-
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP   Document 364    Filed 06/12/13   Page 22 of 34
sergeants, lieutenants, and precinct commanding officers so that all police activity, including
stop, question and frisk, is properly being conducted. The Chief of Patrol and his staff review
UF-250s prior to CompStat meetings and raise issues or concerns about the UF-250s with COs at
the meetings. Borough commanders meet with platoon commanders (lieutenants) regularly and
CompStat meetings now include platoon commanders, as they are part of the precinct
management team. Borough commanders also hold CompStat meetings with COs. Lieutenants
"command the platoon" and supervise the sergeants, which includes annual evaluations and
quarterly assessments. Sergeants are entrusted to "hand[e] conditions that are going on within
the arca that they work." Sergeants testihed that they routinely witness stops made by officers;
routinely monitor the radio (particularly for a person who hts suspect description); speak to
offrcers during roll call about training and ongoing crime conditions for a given tour; review
their officers' UF-250s and frequently discuss the underlying facts of stops with officers to
determine whether an officer is able to articulate a proper basis for the stop; and when they have
an officer drive them during a tour, they use this assignment as an opportunity to train the
offrcer. It is of course not necessary to utter the words "reasonable suspicion" during every one
of these teachable moments, as that legal requirement is as obvious as the requirement of
probable cause for an arrest. Anticrime units are very small and sergeants are usually present in
the field 
- 
which allows for the sergeant to continually assess an officer's understanding of the
propriety of any enforcement, including any stops. Impact officers work in a small geographic
area with their sergeants readily available. Supervisors also verify arrests at the scene. FOF 47.
Individual police officers also testified about how sergeants patrolled with them during tours to
observe stops; discussed the merits of a stop with a supervisor prior to an arrest; and even had
must have been aware of such custom but failed to take adequate corrective or preventive
measures (or both)).
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supervisors corregt them regarding anest charges. FOF 47, 52.20
Monitoríng. Plaintiffs have not proven any flaw in the auditing and command self-
inspection protocol procedures that "demonstrate a deliberate indifference to the need to monitor
officers". Floyd, 283 F,R.D. at 174 n.138; see also Floyd,8l3 F. Supp. 2d at 431-34, 448-49
(which, other than quotas, is the only theory of causation/deliberate indifference that they relied
on for class certification). NYPD has a comprehensive system to monitor ofhcer compliance
with stop and frisk policies with audits both within the commands and from above by QAD.
These include the 802 and 802-A audits, begun in 2003, and the 803 audit (begun in 2010), and
their companion command self-inspections. In addition, there is the quarterly Rand audit of
paperwork linked to 9l I calls (begun in 2008), and the quarterly surveys of the three commands
with the highest increase in UF250s (begun in 2011). FOF 24. Plaintiffs make much of
admittedly consistent failures of the activity log caption of the of the 802 audits, despite the long-
standing almost perfect pass rate for the overall audit. FOF 24. Contrary to being a def,rciency
indicative of deliberative indifference, the fact of these audits, the knowledge of the results and
the myriad ways that NYPD has tried to increase compliance with its own policy (with notable
improvement) 
- 
not a constitutional requirement2l -- of making detailed memo book entries is
the antithesis of deliberate indifference. FOF 53-54 (detailing the NYPD's continuing efforts to
increase memobook entries); 27 (discipline for improper memobooks). V/hile one may infer
deliberate indifference where constitutional violations are obvious, one may only do so where
there is inaction or a failure to make meaningful efforts to address the misconduct. Cash v.
20 Plaintiffs challenge the lack of supervision while at the same time seeking to characterize
officer-supervisor patrols as a punishment. FOF 63-64. They cannot have it both ways.
Plaintiffs' expert was not substantively critical of NYPD's supervision, FOF 49.
2t See Seørles v. Pompilio, 652 F. Supp, 2d 432,444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (lack of police offrcer
paperwork insufhcient basis to infer deliberate indifference).
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County of Erie,654 F.3d 324,334 (2dCir.20ll).
Discipline. Neither have plaintiffs highlighted any problems with the NYPD's processes
for disciplining officers. See FOF 25 (civilian complaints generally); 26-30 (CCRB and DAO);
3l-32 (OCD); 36-42 (performance monitoring);25,39-41(borough-level CCRB monitoring and
the Profile and Assessment Committee); 42 (Career Advancement Review Board), Though it is
by no means a required defense to Monell liability, the evidence established that disciplinary
actions effectively increased from 2008 through 2012. FOF 30; see also FOF 32 (2013 OCD
stop and frisk complaints). Reiter's discipline criticisms can be rejected in toto given his lack of
familiarity with the underlying incidents, FOF 33-34, as well as his cursory analysis of NYPD
disciplinary practices. FOF 35. None of the individual dispositions indicate the City was
deliberately indifferent to the need for discipline. See Zhao v. City of New York, 656 F. Supp. 2d
37 5, 396 (S,D.N.Y. 2009).
III. THERE IS NO 14rh AMENDMENT ("l4th Am.") VIOLATION
A Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional violation. See Lewis,5l8 U.S. at
357. Accordingly, at least one of the plaintiffs had to, but did not, prove an impermissibly race-
based suspicionless stop and/or frisk, which includes discriminatory intent,zz
That a stop andlor frisk violated the 4th Am. is not evidence that such stop and/or frisk
was racially motivated. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U,S. 1, 8 (1944) ("[A]n erroneous oÍ
mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without
more a denial of the equal protection of the laws."); accord Gelb v. Board of Elections, 155 Fed.
Appx. 12, 14 (2d Cir.2005); see also Jewish Home v, Centers þr Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
22 Plaintiffs' individual equal protection claims are a subset of their 4th Am. claims in that they
contend that that race, rather than reasonable suspicion, was the "determinative factor" in their
stops andlor frisks., Floyd, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 450; Floyd,283 F.R.D. at 168-69.
-17 -
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP   Document 364    Filed 06/12/13   Page 25 of 34
693 F.3d 359,363 (3d Cir. 2011). In addition, a plaintiffs' subjective belief that he or she was
stopped because of his or her race is not probative of discriminatory intent. Jones, 691 F.3d at;
see also Krqvtsov v. Town of Greenburgh,2072 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 94819 at49-50 (S.D.N.Y. July
9,2012); Estes-El v. Dumoulin,20ll U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154788 at 12 (E.D,N.Y. Feb. 9,2011).
Also, mere rude and/or disrespectful behavior does not constitute evidence of racial animus.
Jones,691 F.3d at84; Kravtsov,20l2 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 94819 ar 50.
Nor can Fagan's regression analysis impute intent to an individual officer. Reynolds v.
Barrett,685 F.3d 193,204 (2d Cir. 2012) ("statistics showing entity-level discrimination shed
little light on whether a particular individual defendant engaged in purposeful discrimination");
see also U.S. v. Coleman,483 Fed. Appx. 419,421(1Oth Cir. 2012).
Thus, to answer the Court's inquiry during trial, even if there were a widespread pattern
of suspicionless stops, an inference cannot be drawn that race was the determinative factor for
any individual stops (or that a deficiency in the City's systems caused the stops to be made on an
impermissible race basis).
A. Lack of an Underlyine Raciallv-Motivated Stop
The named plaintiffs failed to prove individual equal protection claims against known or
unknown NYPD off,rcers by proving discriminatory purpose against and discriminatory effect
upon at least one of the named plaintiffs. McCleskey v, Kemp,48l U.S. 279,292 (1987). First,
the named plaintiffs failed to prove that their stops were not supported by reasonable suspicion;
therefore, the necessary discriminatory effect is lacking . Floyd, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 444; see also
Whren v. U.5., 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (4th Am. reasonableness does not depend on subjective
intent).23 Fagan's statistics purporting to show citywide racial disparities for stops andlor frisks
" A $ 1983 claim must be analyzed, with reference to "the specific constitutional right allegedly
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cannot be used to show that a particulqr individual fficer engaged in purposeful discrimination,
See Reynolds, 685 F.3d at204.24 Ourlicht is the only named plaintiff who even arguably raised a
claim of discriminatory treatment. He claims he was treated differently from his white friend
Anthony, but even his own testimony established this was not the case.2' FOF 19. The other
named plaintiffs offered nothing more than speculations and subjective beliefs as to why they
were stopped. FOF 3-4, 14, 16;Jones,691 F.3d at 83 (belief as to offrcer's rccial motivation
"unsupported speculation" to which witness "was not competent to testiff").
B. Lack of a \ilidespread Pattern to Which the City Acquiesced
Even assuming a finding that one or more of the stops andlor frisks were uffeasonable
and discriminatory, there is insufhcient evidence of (a) a widespread pattern of racially
motivated stops and/or frisks and/or (b) City acquiescence thereto. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist.,491 U.S.701,737 (1989); Reynolds,506 F.3d atl92;Amnesty,36l F.3d at126.
Plaintifß also have failed to prove a widespread pattern of suspicionless stops, and
consequently cannot prove a widespread pattem of race-based stops. Not even Fagan properly
constrains his 14th Am. analysis to those stops where reasonable suspicion was apparently
lacking; he improperly looks at all 4.43 million stops and decides that race is the determinative
infringed" and must be judged by that standard, Graham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386, 394-95
(1989). Plaintiffs fashioned their claims as first being violative of the 4th Am. as suspicionless
stops and only secondarily being based on race and therefore can proceed only pursuant to the
4th Am. Cf, Melendres v. Arpaio,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73869 at 8-9 (D. Ariz. 2013) (race as a
factor rather than the determinative factor).
2a See also McCleskey v. Kemp,481 U.S. at294 (inappropriate to draw an inference from the
general (i.e,, blacks were more likely state-wide to receive the death penalty) to the speciftc (i.e.,
that the decision-makers in McCleskey's death penalty case acted with discriminatory purpose).
'5 Clive Lino (who is not a plaintiff and therefore cannot support Monell liability) alleged that a
police officer of color received a call on his personal cell phone during his stop and that the cell
phone had a rap-music ring tone. FOF 10, It strains credulity to assume that anyone, including a
police offrcer of color, is a racist because he or she has a rap music ringtone.
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variable that leads to a greater likelihood of being stopped in NYC but fails to control for
reasonable suspicion. FOF 80. Alone, plaintiffs' statistical evidence fails to establish the "gross
statistical disparities" necessary to establish a widespread pattern. 8.g., Hazelwood School Dist.
v. US., 433 U.S. 299,307-08 (1977).
Assuming the accuracy of Fagan's statistics - which the City disputes - Fagan's analysis
only purports to show that (l) blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be stopped than whites,
and (2) the odds of an increase in stops given a lo/o increase in the proportion of black or
Hispanic population versus a IYo increase in the white population is a virtual coin toss. FOF 83-
84. Fagan's results are, however, not practically signihcant. FOF 83. Had Fagan properly
analyzed the statistical data, however, such a likelihood would have been statistically
insignificant or reduced in signihcance. FOF 69-84. Professor Fagan's numbers do not show
statistical disparities arguably found sufficient inTeamsters v. U,5.,431 U.S. 324,337-38 (1976)
(respectively, blacks and Hispanics roughly I I and 15 times less likely to hold a better position
within the company and 39-44% more likely to hold lower paying jobs). See also McCleskey,
481 U.S. at297 ("Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved,
we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious."). Furthermore, the class member
anecdotal evidence is equally as slender. These class members cannot establish that any of their
officers acted with discriminatory purpose (even assuming individual 4th Am. violations).26
C. The Citv Has Not Acquiesced to Anv \ryidespread Pattern
Finally, even if plaintiffs' evidence were sufficient to make out a prima facie case of a
widespread pattern of racially motivated stops, the evidence showed that the City did not
acquiesce to any such pattern. "[P]laintiffs do not assert that the City has an express policy that
26 And as noted in Point l, supra, their number is too small to be probative of a widespread
pattern within the City when compared to the size of the allegedly affected group.
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people of color are to be stopped at a greater rate" . Floyd, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 449-50. In fact,
the City's policy is the opposite. See FOF 23. The same systems in place to detect and handle
4th Am. violations detect and handle the l4th Am, violations. Moreover, evidence from the
Commanding Offrcers to the Chief of the Department shows it is rare that a complaint is made
about a race-based stop. Complaints are usually about non-racial bases for the disputed stops,
FOF 23.27
The Court has asked if there is a self-fulfilling prophecy indicative of impermissible race
motivations because the racial breakdown of stoppees matches the racial breakdown of known
crime suspects such that offrcers assume that minorities are committing crimes and substitute
that assumption for reasonable suspicion. Plaintiffs adduced no evidence whatsoever about
whether the multitude of offrcer witnesses were even aware of the symmetry of these events; nor
did plaintiffs adduce any evidence about any officer witness's subjective intent when making
stops. No expert testimony addressed the viability of this psychological principle in the context
of stop and frisk practices.2s Whatever the Court may understand about self-fulfilling
prophecies, there is no basis in this record whatsoever from which a reasonable inference may be
drawn to support that any one suspicionless stop, let alone a widespread pattern of suspicionless
stops, is impermissibly based on Íace. Any such conclusion would be fanciful speculation,
D. Exnress Racial Classification
The express policies in evidence in this case 
- 
i.e., the NYPD's racial profiling policy and
'z7 Plaintiffs may suggest that this evidence is not credible, but they conflate individual complaints
of race-based stops, which are few and far between, with their own concerns, and those of other
advocates, about racial disparities in stops, as measured against the population. The two
concerns are of course not the same.
'8 Faganwould employ suspect description data in his regression analysis, assuming no selection
bias. FOF 69. FurthermoÍe, a "suspect description" is provided by a victim or witness, not a
police officer.
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related evidence 
- 
are the antithesis of a facially discriminatory policy. Plaintiffs have offered
no evidence of an express racial classification. The present case is unlike cases like Melendres v.
Arpaio,2013 U,S, Dist. LEXIS 73869 at222 (D. Ariz. 2013), where the court found "saturation
patrols" intentionally directed at Hispanics and indiscriminate use of race as a basis for
reasonable suspicion. The NYPD makes deployment decisions based on where crime occuts, not
racial demographics, see Pyke v. Cuomo,567 F.3d74,77-79 (2dCir.2009), and once deployed
officers develop reasonable suspicion based on a variety of factors (e.9., observations and crime
complaints). Race is used in the reasonable suspicion calculus only when constitutionally
permissible . Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F .3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 2000).2e
E. Adverse Effect and Discriminatory Purpose
l. Adverse Effect
It is undisputed here that the percentage of blacks and Hispanics stopped in the City
exceeds their population percentage. There is a disproportionate impact but not the adverse
discriminatory impact necessary for 14th Am. liability. Student Doe I v. Lower Merion School
District,665 F.3d 524,549 (3d Cir. 2011); see also tlS. v, James,257 F.3d 1173,1179 (l0th
Cir. 2001). To determine whether an adverse discriminatory impact exists, there must be reliable
data on the relevant population in the relevant area (i.e., those who should be stopped). See
Chavez v. Illinois State Police,25l F.3d 612,638 &,644-45 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[t]he statistics
proffered must address whether one class is being treated differently from another class that is
2e Plaintiffs may argue that Senator Eric Adams' incredible testimony, FOF 67, shows
discriminatory intent and/or that Kelly's purported non-public statements constitute an "express
policy". However, there was no evidence that the alleged statements were communicated to
supervisors or offrcers in the field andlor the statements guided day{o-day operations of the
NYPD. See Melendres,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73869 at250-51. Chief Esposito and Inspector
Holmes testifred directly contrary. FOF 67.
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otherwise similarly situated", and population benchmarks could not answer the question).
Fagan's statistics suffer from the same benchmarking flaw and cannot be used to predict the
number of stops that would occur by race and in the absence of reasonable suspicion. FOF 69-71,
83-84. In short, he has not shown thatrace is a predictor of a stop. FOF 74,83-84.
2. Discriminatorv Puruose or Intent
Even assuming plaintiffs' statistics indicate a discriminatory impact, plaintifß cannot
establish discriminatory purpose. As the Court in McCleskey reaffirmed, discriminatory purpose
is more than "awareness of consequences". It implies a particular course of action "because ofl'
not merely "in spite ofl' adverse effects. 481 U.S. at 298. As in McCleskey, plaintiffs in the
present case cannot prove that the City established or maintained its stop and frisk program
"because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect". Id, (emphasis added). Mere
knowledge of a discriminatory effect is insufficient. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney,442U.S.
256,279 (1979); accord McCleskey,481 U.S. at298; see also, Wayte v, U.S.,470 U.S. 598,610
(1985); Lee v. City of Los Angeles,25O F.3d 668,687 (9th Cir. 2001). NYPD deploys its officers
to high crime areas based on independent crime reports and such deployment occurs with
greatest frequency in majority minority neighborhoods. But the deployment is to address crime
conditions 
- 
nothing more. Adverse discriminatory impact alone is insuffrcient to establish
discriminatory purpose except in an extreme case not present here. See Arlington Heights v. MeL
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.5, 252, 266 (1977); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 n,12; Floyd, 813 F.
Supp. 2d at 452. In addition, none of the Arlington factors support plaintiffs' case. The
purported history of discrimination at best consists of allegations by the NY State Attorney
General in 1999 (based on flawed and outdated statistical analyses prepared by Fagan) and the
Daniels settlement. These matters hardly constitute "a series of offrcial actions taken for
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invidious purposes." Arlington Heights, ,429U.5. at267. In any event, the City's actions in
seeking to monitor stop activity since 7999 negate discriminatory intent inferences.3O See
Washington v. Davis,426 U.S.229,246 (1976) (affirmative efforts negated inference of
discrimination). Furtherrnore, the record establishes the City always has been motivated by law
enforcement purposes with respect the establishment of its policies relating to stop and frisk.
Any attack by plaintiffs on the efhcacy of the City's law enforcement methods is irrelevant.3l
Brown,221F.3dat339: see also McCleskey,43l U.S, at298-99 &,n.21.
ry. Iniunctive Relief is Not Appropriate
Plaintiffs failed to prove that any injunction is necessary or appropriate. Notwithstanding
the speculative nature of proof of remedy before any defined wrong has been found, plaintiffs'
remedy expert broadly and wrongly opined that a bevy of other experts, plus a monitor and
various other stakeholders, and a significant outlay of public funds to them, are needed to
determine what the remedy should be. FOF 92-94, Plaintiffs failed to prove that the NYPD
systems already in place, including its early intervention monitoring, might require more than
minor adjustments, as opposed to wholesale creation or re-creation of systems which monitors
have overseen. Id. Plaintifß offered no concrete evidence to prove that third-party imposed
measures would be more effective than internally created ones, or to prove that de-policing and
threat to public safety would not result from outside interference. Id.
Plaintiffs failed to address the effect of a federal court injunction, and any concomitant
specter of contempt, particularly when NYPD is already significantly monitored by various
30 In addition, there is no evidence in the record that the City has ever negatively departed from
its processes for addressing stop and frisk issues. Arlington Heights,429 U.S. at267.
3l The Court precluded the City from offering rebuttal evidence supporting the effectiveness of
the NYPD's stop and frisk practices in reducing and preventing crime, which the City contends
enhances its claim that it had a law enforcement rather than a discriminatory purpose.
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federal and state entities, and faces the possibility that the NYC Council will subject it to an
Inspector General. Instead of being a pawn for the varying interests of the other branches of
government, NYPD should be left to investigate and fight crime as it alone is expert in doing in
this metropolis, and continue to be accountable for any legal errors through individual lawsuits
for damages 
- 
not by a structural injunction crafted in a courtroom, far from the realities of
everyday policing. See Rahman v. Chertoff,530 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Brown
v, Plata,131 S. Ct. 1910, 1955 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But structural injunctions do not
simply invite judges to indulge policy preferences. They invite judges to indulge incompetent
policy preferences. Three years of law school and familiarity with pertinent Supreme Court
precedents give no insight whatsoever into the management of social institutions.").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter judgment in favor of Defendant City of
New York in all respects.
Dated: New York, New York
June 12,2013
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